Opinion | Balasore Accident: How Incorporating Robust Technology Can Prevent Recurrence of Train Mishaps

The death toll from a three-train crash officially nears 300 post the Balasore train tragedy, which occurred on June 2, 2023, in one of the blood-curdling train accidents in the history of the Indian Railways (IR). 205 injured people were admitted to the SCB Medical College and Hospital, 45 are still under treatment, including 12 in ICU. Out of the 12 victims undergoing treatment inside the ICU unit of the state-run SCB Medical College and Hospital at Cuttack in the state of Odisha in Eastern India, the condition of two victims continues to remain critical, as per the statement provided to the media by one of the officials of the hospital. Over 1200 passengers have been injured and an unspecified number of victims are still missing. No one, as of now, is aware of their state of health or fate.

81 bodies of victims remain unidentified at AIIMS, Bhubaneswar. 70 people have already given blood samples for DNA testing, the reports are still awaited, as per the media reports quoting an official. The reports also indicate that authorities of AIIMS Bhubaneswar on Saturday wrote a letter to the Delhi-based Central Forensic Science Laboratory to send the DNA sampling test reports for at least 15 victims as their family members have been most anxiously awaiting the verification reports. The Indian Railways too, in a public notice, has appealed to relatives of the deceased in the Bahanaga train accident to come forward and give their DNA samples to establish their identity and relationship with the deceased.

Such a painful situation could have been averted to a significant extent, if the Indian Air Force (IAF) had been activated by the Central government, in shifting the life support requiring and other victims with grave injuries by airlifting them from the hospitals at the accident site in MI 17-V5 helicopters and then by air ambulances from Kalaikunda, the nearest IAF base, to admit them in various speciality hospitals located in different parts of our country.

In a joint mission with the IR, the IAF would also have been of extreme help in quickly flying in the near and dear ones of all passengers onboard the Shalimar-Chennai Coromandel Express by coordinating with the IR on a war footing and arranging temporary accommodation with coolers, fans, food, water, bio-toilets and other basic necessities. It would have helped the near and dear ones of both the deceased and the critically injured victims towards the process of quick identification.

Precisely the reason why I, on my part, very humbly and specifically made repeated appeals for the same, through various national TV channels, to the prime minister and the DG, NDRF, while envisaging the degree of the disaster. The government along with the Disaster Management think-tank must explore the feasibility of forming such coordinated units at the earliest both for IR and Indian Civil Aviation. Both ministries, in my opinion, should be equipped with their own air ambulances and helicopters as an integral part of their disaster management unit.

The Disaster

On June 2, 2023, the Shalimar-Chennai Central Coromandel Express, Bengaluru-Howrah Super Fast Express and a goods train collided with each other. The Chennai-bound Coromandel Express under unexplainable circumstances changed its pre-determined railway track and its engine and went on to scale the top of the goods train that was in a static position on its right, in no time, after crashing into the goods train, derailing most of its coaches around 7 pm on June 2 near the Bahanaga Bazar station. A couple of coaches of the Coromandel Express reportedly hit the last couple of coaches of the Bengaluru- Howrah Express which was passing by at the same time in the opposite direction from the right of the static goods train.

While the chronology of the event appears to be absolutely perplexing, the investigation is on. The sabotage angle cannot be ruled out too, as intriguingly, the junior engineer at the Soro section Signal Unit has now gone missing along with his family, post facing CBI’s questioning at an undisclosed location. The CBI has zeroed in on “human interference in signalling” as the reason for the accident.

Top railway officials familiar with the CBI probe and the parallel Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) inquiry said the digital circuit for the interlocking signal was manually bypassed while repairing a breakdown. “The restored signal did not match the intended track position, leading to the Coromandel Express entering a loop line and crashing into a stationary freight train carrying iron ore, and then jumped the tracks to hit another passenger train moving in the opposite direction.”

While the turn of events continue to remain beyond normal and as I have been consistently raising my observation and maintaining my point of view on the scope unlimited for manual interventions at various vital operational areas of the Indian Railways, it is imperative in my humble appreciation as a safety and security analyst to explore the ways to negate and eliminate the probable causes of such recurring disasters by incorporating more robust technology and minimal to nil manual interventions in the operational areas, barring the Divisional Control Rooms.

It is imperative in my opinion to make an attempt to understand the difference in movement control, navigation and radio communication procedures between Civil Aviation and the Indian Railways. To simplify the difference in procedural approach, I would like to first elaborate on the policies adopted by the Aviation Industry globally related to Movement Control, Navigation Mechanism, Radio Communication and Safety Procedures vis-à-vis the policies of the Indian Railways.

Civil Aviation

Movement Control, Navigation, Radio Communication, Safety and Other Operational Procedures in the Civil Aviation Industry

Movement Control: In the case of air traffic, there are multiple Flight Information Regions (FIR) through which all aircraft take off from the origin, gain altitude, cruise at permissible flight level, descend and finally, land at the destination. One Air Traffic Control (ATC) for a specific flight information region is tasked with the responsibility of navigating all aircraft that are:

1. Taking off from the airport/s located under its flight information
2. Landing at the airport/s located under its flight information
3. Overflying through its Air space from a third origin to a third

Air Navigation: Air navigation is defined as “the process of determining the geographic position and maintaining the desired direction of an aircraft relative to the surface of the Earth.”

There are three types of navigation: Dead Reckoning Navigation, Visual Navigation, and Electronic Navigation. Visual and electronic navigation are backup techniques to dead reckoning.

Surface Movement: Surface Movement is controlled by the Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (SMGCS). An SMGCS plan facilitates the safe movement of aircraft and vehicles at the airport by establishing more rigorous control procedures and requiring enhanced visual aids.

Taxi And Ground Movement Operations

Issues the route for the aircraft/vehicle to follow in the movement area in concise and easy-to-understand terms. The taxi clearance/route must include the specific route to follow. When a taxi clearance to a runway is issued to an aircraft, confirm the aircraft has the correct runway assignment. All of these are responsibilities of Ground Control (known to pilots as Tower).

Approach Control (known to pilots as APPROCH)

The approach (APP) controllers are responsible for the provision of air traffic service to departing and arriving traffic in a TMA (terminal movement area). They are the link between the Tower and Area controllers and normally serve aircraft during the climb, descent and approach phases.

Area Control (known to pilots as CONTROL)

The area controller (also called en-route controller) is a person that provides air traffic control (ATC) service within an area control centre (ACC). They normally serve flights during the climb, cruise and initial descent phases. The Area controller’s job is dominated by the process of discovering and solving conflicts. By contrast, Approach and Tower controllers are mostly occupied by sequencing the traffic for taking off and landing. While it is common practice for an area controller to transfer several aircraft at the same sector exit point (vertically separated), this is not an option for the tower and approach controllers when their “exit point” is the runway threshold.

Compared to their tower and approach colleagues, the area controllers do not have to communicate as much with each flight. In the simplest case, there are only two calls – the initial contact (aircraft checking in on the frequency) and the final contact (when the communication is transferred to the next sector). If no other aircraft crosses their path and the flight is in the middle of the cruise, there is no need to exchange additional messages. While these flights are monitored while in the sector, they do not contribute to the communication workload. Therefore, the area controllers are able to handle more aircraft simultaneously.

Navigational Aids/Instruments

RADAR (Radio Detection And Ranging): RADAR is an electronic system which measures the range and bearing of objects by transmitting an electromagnetic pulse at the object and listening for the echo.

The navigation instruments indicate the position of the aircraft in relation to a selected navigation facility or fix. This group of instruments includes various types of course indicators, range indicators, glideslope indicators, and bearing pointers. Newer aircraft with more technologically advanced instrumentation provide blended information, giving the pilot more accurate positional information.

Navigation instruments are comprised of indicators that display GPS, very high frequency (VHF) omnidirectional radio range (VOR), non- directional beacon (NDB), and instrument landing system (ILS) information. The instruments indicate the position of the aircraft relative to a selected navigation facility or fix. They also provide pilotage information so the aircraft can be manoeuvred to keep it on a predetermined path. The pilotage information can be in either two or three dimensions relative to the ground-based or space-based navigation information.

Accident averting mechanisms and instruments in aviation

Separation minima: Separation Minima is the minimum required distance between aircraft. Vertically usually 1000 feet below flight level 290 (29,000 feet above the ground level), 2000 feet above flight level 290. Horizontally, depending on the radar, 3 NM or more.

TCAS

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is a family of airborne devices that function independently of the ground-based air traffic control (ATC) system, and provide collision avoidance protection for a broad spectrum of aircraft types. All TCAS systems provide some degree of collision threat alerting and a traffic display.

Also known as the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), it is an airborne system designed to increase cockpit awareness of nearby aircraft and serve as a last defence against mid-air collisions. The system monitors the airspace around an aircraft for other transponder- equipped aircraft that may present a collision threat. TCAS operates independently of ground-based equipment to provide pilots with guidance on how to avoid a potential collision.

TCAS works by sending interrogations to other aircraft’s transponders. The transponder will reply to the interrogation in a similar way it responds to radar. From the time difference between the interrogation and the reply, the distance to the other aircraft is calculated. The reply itself contains the altitude of the other aircraft.

A research-based study report on the limitations/ineffectiveness of TCAS, conducted by SMEs of Oxford University

Abstract— “Many wireless communications systems found in aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them fundamentally vulnerable to attack. With affordable software-defined radios available, a novel threat has emerged, allowing a wide range of attackers to easily interfere with wireless avionic systems. Whilst these vulnerabilities are known, predicting their ultimate effect is difficult. A major factor in this effect is how flight crew respond, especially whether their extensive training in fault handling helps to manage attacks. To investigate this we conducted a user study, inviting 30 Airbus A320 type-rated pilots to fly simulator scenarios in which they were subjected to attacks on their avionics. We use wireless attacks on three safety-related systems, based on existing literature: Traffic Collision.

Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and the Instrument Landing System (ILS). To analyse their response, we collected control input data coupled with closed and open interview responses.

We found that all three attack scenarios created significant control impact and cost of disruption through turnarounds, avoidance manoeuvres, and diversions. They further increased workload, distrust in the affected system, and in 38 percent of cases caused the attacked safety system to be switched off entirely. All pilots felt the scenarios were useful, with 93.3 percent feeling that simulator training for wireless attacks could be valuable.”

(Source: A View from the Cockpit: Exploring Pilot Reactions to Attacks on Avionic Systems)

ADS-B and its advantages

ADS-B is a new surveillance technology designed to help modernize the air transportation system. It provides foundational technology for improvements related to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (or NextGen) and the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management (ATM) Research Programme (or SESAR).

ADS-B stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast.

• Automatic because it periodically transmits information with no pilot or operator involvement required.
• Dependent because the position and velocity vectors are derived from the Global Positioning System (GPS) or other suitable Navigation Systems (i.e., FMS).
• Surveillance because it provides a method of determining 3- dimensional position and identification of aircraft, vehicles, or other
• Broadcast because it transmits the information available to anyone with the appropriate receiving equipment.

It replaces radar technology with satellites, bringing major advantages. Radar relies on radio signals and antennas to determine an aircraft’s location. ADS-B uses satellite signals to track aircraft movements.

ADS-B Out

ADS-B Out works by broadcasting information about an aircraft’s GPS location, altitude, ground speed and other data to ground stations and other aircraft, once per second. Air traffic controllers and properly equipped aircraft can immediately receive this information. This offers more precise tracking of aircraft compared to radar technology, which sweeps for position information every 5 to 12 seconds.

Radio Communication Procedure

Different frequencies, including multiple frequencies, are allotted for all sections of the Air Traffic Control to facilitate uninterrupted radio communication between the ATC in charge and the aircraft during surface movement, takeoff, climbing phase, bearing, Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) for diverging the aircraft from its predetermined course to avoid sudden or existing severe weather formation midair, cruising altitude, descending path, runway to be used for touchdown and taxiway to be followed for parking.

In addition to these, the pilots also have the option to communicate with the relevant ATC via satellite phone to convey any situation, including any technical glitch/emergency on board, if there is any disruption in radio communication with the ATC in charge of the FIR.

Pilots also have the option to communicate with other aircraft in the vicinity via dedicated frequency to convey any situation including any technical glitch/emergency situation on board, if there is any disruption in radio communication with the ATC in charge of the FIR. The pilots can also establish radio communication with their company via dedicated radio frequencies if faced with any emergency situation while facing disruption in radio communication with the ATC in charge of the FIR.

It is important to note that

• All radio communications between the pilots and the ATC are recorded and preserved under safe custody.
• All communications held inside the cockpit are recorded via a cockpit voice recorder.

Indian Railways

Movement Control, Navigation, Radio Communication, Safety and Other Operational Procedures in the Indian Railways

While the Radio Communication procedure in the Indian Railways appear to be unmethodical as compared to the Civil Aviation Industry, there is also a dearth of detailed available data in the public domain related to this segment. Movement Control and Navigation appear to be primarily controlled with the change of lines and signals by the Divisional / Zonal Control Rooms, with scopes of manual interventions. Following are excerpts of the operational procedures of the Indian Railways.

Interlocking

Interlocking means an arrangement of signals, points and other appliances, operated from a panel or lever frame, so inter-connected by Mechanical locking or Electrical locking or both that their operation must take place in proper sequence to ensure safety.

Types of Interlocking

Mechanical Interlocking

The era of interlocking started with mechanical frames. In mechanical signalling, since the functions are operated by levers, the relationship that should exist between the functions can be transferred to exist between the levers.

To ensure that the signal can be taken ‘OFF’ only after the point is correctly set, we can arrange the interlocking between the signal lever and point lever to be such that the signal lever can be reversed only after the point lever is in the correct position, viz. ‘Normal’ or ‘Reverse’, as the case may be. As the size of yards & train movements increased, the size of lever frames also increased. These lever frames not only increased in size occupying more space but also required intensive maintenance.

Panel Interlocking (Relay)

With the advent of Electro-mechanical relays, lever frames gave way to relay interlocking-based installations. This development resulted in relatively faster operation, fail-safe operation and reduced size of buildings required for housing of interlocking installations. With further increase in traffic and expansion of the railway network, panel Interlocking installations were commissioned.

Route Relay Interlocking

Route Relay interlocking is the same as Panel Interlocking with Electro-Mechanical Relays doing the Interlocking except that it can be employed for big yards. The interlocking is done between one route and another route. Another important feature in terms of the operating point of view is that the SM has to only press two buttons, the Signal button & Route Button (entry-exit system). He doesn’t have to individually operate the points to the required position.

Solid State Interlocking

Computer-based interlocking uses thousands of electro-mechanical relays requiring complex wiring and interconnections. The wiring diagrams for such installations run into hundreds of sheets. Individual relays, wiring and interconnections along with thousands of shouldered joints are required to be physically examined and certified. This exercise requires traffic blocks of long durations and large manpower to manage the traffic during blocks. Even for small yard re-modelling like the addition of a loop line, all the above activities are required to be redone. Therefore, the advantages of relay-based interlocking installations are being nullified.

The SSI system occupies considerably less space, consumes less power, is more reliable and is easy to install and maintain. Also, initial commissioning & changes due to yard re-modelling can be carried out in negligible time requiring skeleton manpower for traffic management during the blocks. Unlike PI or RRI, Microprocessors (ICs) are doing the Interlocking based on pre-determined logic circuits.

Indirect and Direct Interlocking

Indirect interlocking means that the points are set and locked from one place and the signals are operated from another place and another lever frame; the interlocking is effected by means of keys carried from one place to the other. Direct interlocking means that all levers, viz. the point, the point locks and the signal levers are concentrated in one lever frame and worked therefrom; the interlocking is effected by means of rigid connections between levers without the use of keys.

Isolation

A line is said to be isolated from the adjacent line or lines when no movement on the adjoining lines can foul it. Isolation can be achieved by any of the following methods.

(a) Snag dead end, (b) sand hump, (c) trap points, (d) setting of points

(e) permanently locked points, (f) scotch block, (g) hay’s derail and (h) derailing switch.

Note: For the purpose of the definition of Isolation (f) scotch block and (g) hay’s derail are not means of Isolation.

Snag Dead End

• This is an extended portion of the track with an erected obstruction with buffers at the end.
• The length is at least 180 metres.
• This is used to isolate the main line from the loop line.
• This is an efficient substitute for signal overlap.

Sand Hump

A sand hump is an extended portion of rail embedded in the sand. It is a total of 60 m in length, with an increasing gradient of 1 in 60, of which the first 30 m is laid with normal track embedded in sand and the remaining 30 m is an earthen lump of uniform 4 m width.

Trap Points

• This is a single rail cut.
• This rail cut will be away from the adjacent line.
• To provide isolation, the trap point will be open.
• When it is open and if a vehicle moves the vehicle will derail.
• This is provided to isolate the running line from the non- running line and the main line from the loop line.

Permanently locked points

• Certain points, including traps are kept permanently locked.
• The keys for these points are kept in on-duty station Master custody.
• These points have to remain set and locked in normal position.
• These keys are handed over, when these points are required to be worked.

Scotch Block

• A lump of log covered with iron sheets and coloured red.
• This will be connected with a chain tied up on the earth.
• This is a place across the rail and locked to prevent vehicles from moving away.
• If the vehicle moves the vehicle will derail.
• This is used normally to isolate the running line from the non-running line.

Hay’s Derail

It is a device designed to limit the movement of free-rolling, uncontrolled wagons/ vehicles. This is accomplished by grinding the flange of a wheel up and over the railhead, and dropping the wheel clear of the rail on the outside of the rails. The wheels lodging in the tie cribbing and ballast halt the movement of wagons /vehicles.

Derailing Switch

• This is an extended portion of the track ending with some sand.
• The distance from the points is about 15 feet.
• This is used to isolate the main line from the loop line.
• This is an efficient substitute for signal overlap under approved special instructions.
• The normal setting of points is for derailing the switch.
• If the vehicle moves, the vehicle will derail on the sand at the end of the derailing switch.
• Simultaneous reception is possible with CRS permission.

Command, Control And Coordination Of Emergency Rescue Operations On The Open Line

Purpose

1. The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is to delineate responsibilities and procedures for the control and coordination of all responses to emergency situations on the mainline.
2. To provide step-by-step guidance on how to deal with incidents should they happen.
3. Particular note should be taken of the need to provide suitable training to keep staff aware of what needs to be done in the event of a serious incident.

There is a difference between a disaster and an accident. All disasters need not be the outcome of train accidents, neither are all accidents classified as disasters. Accidents are occurrences where safety has been affected. Disasters are those situations, which cause acute distress to passengers, employees and outsiders and may even be caused by external factors and unless promptly managed the distress levels are likely to increase with time.

Centres of Activity

• Headquarter
• Divisional Commercial Control
• Site of Accident

Headquarter

1. Commercial Control will have DOT and railway Telephones, FAX, a photocopier machine and a PC with Internet.
2. Commercial Control office in Headquarters would be manned by officers round the clock basis. In case of serious accidents of passengers carrying trains, CCM/G will immediately come to the Control office. In his absence, CCM(IT)/CCM(S&M) and CCM/G will come to the Control office. If Dy.CCM/G is not available, SCM/G will attend. Thereafter, Control duties will be assigned as per the roster for manning the Control office around the clock. Besides regular staff manning commercial control at least one officer and one inspector will remain in the control round the clock. The officer deputed will be responsible for the proper functioning of the control.
3. Commercial control in the Headquarters office would constantly monitor the information relayed from the divisions and other railways regarding the dead and injured persons and enquiry offices opened at important stations.
4. Maintain a log of events

Divisional Control

1. Control Offices will have DOT/Rly. Telephones, FAX, photocopier machine and a PC with an Internet connection. The details of telephones and faxes of all the divisions should also be kept.
2. Commercial Control in Division would be manned by officers on round the clock basis. In case of a serious accident of passenger carrying trains, DCM in his absence, DCM/Catering, where available or one of the ACMs will immediately come to the Control. Thereafter, Control duties will be assigned as per the roster for manning the Control The second senior-most commercial officer of the division will work as in charge of the Commercial control.
3. Information collected should be relayed to all concerned including HQ Commercial Control, Enquiry Offices opened at stations through phone, fax, without delay.
4. Divisional control will advise headquarters commercial control, details of assistance required from headquarters or the adjoining divisions.
5. Maintain a log of events.

Site of Accident

Sr. DCM will ensure the following functions:

1. Sufficient number of TTEs/TCs and licensed porters in uniform rushed to the site.
2. Arrangements made for the speedy dispersal of stranded passengers of the train(s) involved in the accident, as well as of trains regulated or terminated as a result of the accident in association with the Operating Department. In case of non- availability of rail services, adequate arrangements should be made to disperse them by arranging road vehicles etc.
3. Accommodation in hotels/dharamshalas for accommodating passengers and providing resting facilities to officials working at the site.
4. Making arrangements to inform the next of kin of the deceased/injured persons involved in an accident.
5. TTEs of the affected train will not leave the site of the accident till ordered by the site in charge.
6. Train Superintendent or Conductor or senior most Ticket Checking staff till a commercial officer from the division reaches to the site of the accident, will allot duties to each available ticket Checking/other Commercial staff/volunteers in a manner to ensure maximum help to passengers under the prevalent circumstances. This function will be taken over by a Commercial officer as soon as he reaches to the site of the accident.

In Sr. DCM’s absence, DCM will attend the site of the accident and work as the site in charge of the Commercial department.

In case of involvement of Goods Train, the following actions will be taken promptly

1. Arrangements of adequate labour by mobilising resources available at other stations as well as from the market locally, for unloading of material from the wagons involved in an accident.
2. Adequate tarpaulins to cover the contents so that these are saved from rain etc.
3. Arrangements of gunny bags etc. for retrieval of loose materials lying at the site of the accident.
4. Consignor/consignee would be informed regarding the involvement of their consignments in an accident besides intimating forwarding/destination The information will be conveyed through the Commercial Control of the division/HQ as the case may be. Also to make arrangements for delivery of the consignments at the site of the accident if they desire.
5. Arrangements of road transport for evacuation of the contents from the site of the accident.
6. To coordinate with the Operating branch for the supply of adequate empty stock for transhipment/disposal of the contents.
7. Till such time, the consignment involved in the accident is not removed/transported; the same shall be made over to RPF Incharge for security purposes.

Staff using their personal mobile phones in connection with the accident will be eligible for a lump sum grant of Rs.200/- without any clerical work to be performed in accidents.

In case of bodies, which remain unclaimed/unidentified, the division shall get such bodies photographed by hiring a photographer. Each body will be given a number, which can be displayed, on the body of the dead for subsequent identification.

Safety of Passengers/Passengers’ luggage

1. Separate tents for packages/bags and belongings of the injured and dead should be arranged and guarded with the help of RPF at the site.
2. A list of each item with distinguishing marks should be made.
3. Luggage claimed should be handed over on satisfactory proof of ownership.
4. Unclaimed items will be safely transferred to one of the stations and for this purpose, if need be, road vehicles will be utilized/hired. Their personal belongings are useful in establishing the identity of the deceased/missing.

Catering arrangements

It will be ensured by the site incharge.

1. DCM will ensure that adequate eatables, water etc. are available at the site of the accident in case of involvement of a passenger carrying a train in an accident. This arrangement will be made for the passengers free of charge at the site of the accident and at the roadside station where the train involved in the accident is stabled temporarily.
2. Gas stoves, Gas cylinders, drinking water, provisions for preparation of meals, etc., should be rushed to the site for leftover stranded passengers and officials involved in rescue operations. This will be augmented later, if necessary. Sufficient cooks and catering staff from departmental catering or catering contractors would be ensured at the site for arranging tea, biscuits, packed meals like pooris and vegetables for the stranded passengers, and staff engaged in rescue and restoration.
3. Sr. DCMs would prepare an advance section-wise nomination of catering agencies both departmental and private for rushing to the site.
4. To supplement railways catering arrangements, nearby Dhabas and hotels should be contacted and arrangements made for opening up stalls at the site.

Hospitals

1. One assistant officer each in the hospitals will be deputed to look after where injured passengers are admitted or dead passengers are In case of the non-availability of an assistant officer, one CMI/ inspector/Sr. the supervisor will be deputed by Sr. DCM. All dead bodies must be photographed after wiping their faces to establish identity.
2. The nominated officer will work in close coordination with doctors and render the required help.
3. Officer in charge of the hospital will assist kith and kin of the passengers involved, in the disposal of dead bodies, and release injured passengers.
4. Deputed officials will obtain details like name, address, of hospitalized/dead passengers. He will also obtain the details of the injured, and the nature of the injuries with the help of doctors and convey it to the divisional Commercial control.

Payment of ex-gratia

1. Payment of ex-gratia at the site as well as in the hospitals will be arranged on the basis of the identification of injuries by the doctors.
2. DCM/DCM will ensure the availability of sufficient cash for payment of ex-gratia.
3. CCO will also depute claims officials at the site/hospitals to assist the relatives of the injured/dead passengers regarding the filing of claims for compensation.
4. If some injured passengers/kith & kin of the deceased involved in an accident have not been paid ex-gratia at the site of an accident or in the hospital, arrangements should be made to pay at their residence by deputing officials of the division or seeking the help of the other divisions/railway. Such payment will be witnessed by the Pardhan or Sarpanch or any other responsible official of the area.

Enquiry offices at the important station en route

This function will be ensured by the incharge available in divisional control.

1. Emergency offices would be opened at important stations as per the route of the On the basis of need, enquiry offices would be opened at other important stations also.
2. All these enquiry offices should have DOT and Railway telephones with STD facility, Fax machine, photocopier and a PC with an Internet connection. Identical telephone numbers will be preferred.
3. These enquiry offices would be manned on round the clock basis by deputing additional staff. It will be supervised by a Commercial officer, where feasible/commercial inspector/CIT.
4. These control offices should constantly keep in touch with the divisional Commercial Control.
5. Emergency offices would display the list of dead and injured passengers on the notice board at stations.
6. Officers attending these emergency offices would not interact with the press.
7. Sr. DCMs will prepare their own contingency plan on similar lines.
8. Withdrawal of Money from station earnings.

While the operational mechanism of both the modes of conveyance have been discussed, the Indian Railways appears to me as a tad disorganised, with scope of too many manual interventions at crucial operational areas, it would continue to remain the best soft target for subversive elements while being prone to sabotage.

The Kavach anti-collision system for trains, just like TCAS for aircraft, is relevant only between the trains in the vicinity of 5 kilometres. It would not be able to share the data related to normal or abnormal situations, with the Zonal/Divisional control rooms, which would be in a helpless condition, despite being able to monitor the movement of the trains, in case Kavach installed in one or multiple trains face technical glitch.

With the introduction of many high-speed trains like Vande Bharat Express that when utilizing its maximum speed of 160 Kmph, would just take close to two minutes to collide with another train located 5 kilometres away on its track either rushing from the opposite direction or in static condition. Also, the RFID Tags for Kavach that operate on High Frequencies (otherwise categorised as Passive RFID) are being placed on unsecured railway tracks and thus making it susceptible to being tampered with by subversive elements and sabotage.

In such a situation, my suggestion to improve the safety factors would be

1. Introduction of ADS-B Technology in addition to Kavach in trains, just like ADS-B with TCAS in If ADS-B technology is adopted in trains under safety measures, it would only do a world of good as far as securing the irreplaceable lives of train passengers are concerned. With ADS-B’s positional updates per second, which can also be received by the concerned Zonal and Divisional Control Rooms of the Indian Railways, the time and area of identification of two or more trains on the same track and the scope of averting the collission/s will increase enormously.
2. Like aviation, a horizontal Separation Minima must be maintained between the two adjacent railway tracks.
3. Outside the train stations, covering of railway tracks with the help of side walls on both sides with materials that would be able to bear the impact of a derailed train at its full speed, must be explored. It is the easy access to railway tracks by anyone and everyone, that facilitates the acts of sabotage. Covering would also help reduce suicides and unintended killing of animals.
4. The platforms must be treated as security-checked areas of the airports, where no one but the security-checked passengers would only be allowed post thorough security checks by the CISF, which would follow the same procedures conducted at the airports.
5. Movement Control, Navigation Mechanism and Radio Communication Procedure must be upgraded to the level of Air Traffic Control, as discussed earlier.
6. Identification of trains should also be upgraded with Squawk.
7. Manual Identification (with train numbers alone) must immediately be eradicated.
8. Technology must replace manual interventions in crucial operational areas.
9. There should be cabin voice recorders and train recorders (Blackbox) inside the pilot’s cabins, mandatorily.
10. All radio communications between the train pilots and Zonal/Divisional/Station Control Rooms must be recorded and kept in safe custody.
11. At railway junctions, intersections, drastic decreases in speed must immediately be adopted.
12. All engineers assigned with the tasks of installation, operation and maintenance of critical mechanisms must be loaded with weatherproof body cameras having facilities to be monitored by mobile apps both on Android and iOS platforms and having 12 hours of uninterrupted recording facility with their body cameras in switched on status mandatorily.
13. The charitable accommodation of extra luggage, across all classes of travel, must immediately be brought to an end on war footing. Such free hand to audacity not only provides impetus to unruly and irresponsible segments of passengers in enjoying lawlessness, irrespective of their financial background but also put the load capacity of the rakes at risk. A drastic decrease in the volume of extra luggage must immediately be implemented with a drastic increase in extra luggage charges. If possible, extra rakes with Attendants must be introduced for the checked baggage to be placed. Alternatively, all the rakes must be modified to accommodate a drastically decreased volume of extra luggage underneath each rake. The passengers can only board the train only with hand baggage of a specified size.
14. The scope of mutual changing of berths must immediately be Just like the Aircraft, it should be made non- permissible and once committed the passenger/s concerned would no more be eligible to receive the compensation amount in case of accident-related death or injury.
15. Finally, inclusion of the DNA and blood group details of the passengers must be made mandatory by the Indian Railways which should be published along with other details in the PNR. This will instantly help in identifying the victims, by their near and dear ones. Such data would not only help in identifying the mingled dead bodies, found at various places at the accident site as a result of the devastating impact, but also would be of significant help in expediting the identification process of the other unidentified severed bodies, owing to suicides, suspected murder cases etc.

Arya Ghosh is a National Safety, Security, Aviation and Avionics Analyst. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.